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How to “Ravage” a Country: Destruction, Conservation, 
and Assessment of  Natural Environments in Early 
Modern Military Thought
Jan Philipp Bothe
University of  Göttingen
jan-philipp.bothe@phil.uni-goettingen.de 
This article examines the practice of  “ravaging” the countryside as a part of  Early 
Modern military thought. It analyses the arguments for destroying or conserving 
cultivated natural environments and how they were integrated into the emerging 
theoretical framework on war in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I argue that 
depriving the enemy of  local natural resources by consuming or destroying them was 
an extreme form of  exercising control over an area which was used to exert control 
over both the supplies for an enemy army and the use of  land by the local population. 
To legitimize this practice, specific arguments were used: destruction was meant to 
“shorten” a war, and gradually use of  this tactic was confined to the home country and 
defense against enemy invasions. In addition, it was important which resources were 
targeted: while the destruction of  forage and harvests was seen as a form of  short-term 
damage, cutting down trees counted as a form of  lasting damage that was undesirable. 
Some authors of  works on military strategy started to argue that devastating the land in 
the enemy’s country was unpractical, and that (forced) contributions from locals were 
far more useful. Thus, while authors of  works on military strategy did make arguments 
against “scorched earth” warfare and the “ravaging” of  the countryside, they did so 
purely out of  practical considerations which rested on notions of  utility, rather than out 
of  any humanitarian considerations.
Keywords: early modern period, environment, warfare, military thought, wartime 
destruction
During the winter months of  1688 and 1689, much of  the land in the territory 
of  the Electoral Palatinate was in flames. After the devastation of  the Thirty 
Years’ War and the Dutch War earlier in the century, the border region along the 
Rhine again had become a major gateway for French troops traveling towards 
the German Empire at the outbreak of  the Nine Years’ War. The roots of  this 
conflict lay not only in the events leading to the Glorious Revolution in 1688, but 
also in King Louis XIV’s fear that a strong Habsburg Empire might be able to 
contest the territorial gains that he had achieved during the Reunions.1
1  Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 191–193; Wilson, German armies, 88–89.
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As the bulk of  the German armies was still fighting the Ottoman Empire 
in the Great Turkish War, Louis XIV’s forces met with little resistance when 
occupying a large part of  the Palatinate. Important cities and fortresses of  the 
area, like Heidelberg (the seat of  the Elector of  the Palatinate), Mannheim, 
Worms, Kaiserslautern, and Speyer, surrendered within weeks.2 But the French 
did not enjoy a quick and decisive victory. German princes continued to put 
up resistance. They soon opposed the French troops, together with the forces 
of  the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I. After the Glorious Revolution, the 
Generalstaaten and England under William of  Orange also joined the conflict. 
In the autumn of  1688, the Minister of  War François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis 
de Louvois, and the king’s consultant Jules-Louis Bolé, Marquis de Chamlay 
suggested to put the Palatinate and other occupied areas to the torch after 
having collected large amounts of  contributions. By demolishing major cities 
and strongholds in the region, Louvois hoped to slow down any progress of  
German forces against French borders.3 At its core, this was a defensive strategy. 
The act became known as the infamous “devastation of  the Palatinate,” as it was 
characterized in various pamphlets which were intended to foment a sense of  
scandal. The destruction of  the Palatinate became a media event.4
The French army was not the first and not the last to use this tactic.5 
Nevertheless, the “burning of  the Palatinate” was a prominent example of  a 
tactic put to use in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that has been called 
“scorched earth warfare.”6 Both major cities but the surrounding countryside 
suffered as a consequence of  efforts to transform the region into a “logistic 
obstacle.”7 In this article, my intention is to demonstrate that this devastation 
was not simply an act of  desperation, but rather was a tactic which drew on an 
element of  Early Modern military thought. 
2  Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 193–194; Dotzauer, Rheinland-Pfalz, 164–66.
3  Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 194–95; Dotzauer, Rheinland-Pfalz, 167–68; Lynn, “A Brutal Necessity,” 79–83.
4  On this see Dosquet, “Die Verwüstung der Pfalz,” 333–69; Wrede, Reich und seine Feinde, 400–3; Bothe, 
“Von Mordbrennern,” 11–47.
5  In addition to the references to warfare in Antiquity used by Early Modern authors (for instance the 
scorched earth warfare that Caesar attributes to Vercingetorix in his “Commentarii de bello Gallico”), there 
are numerous mentions of  other instances of  such conduct. Frank Tallett, for example, listed the deliberate 
destruction wrought by Maurice of  Nassau or the Elizabethan generals in Ireland in the 1590s as scorched 
earth warfare and a practice of  warfare that targeted the economic resources of  an enemy. Tallett, War and 
Society, 58–59.
6  As described by Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 195.
7  Ibid.
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Most handbooks and memoirs concerning the art of  war included examples 
of  when and how to “ravage” a country. These reflections also underline that 
this type of  “scorched earth warfare” not only targeted towns and villages by 
burning down buildings and driving off  or killing their inhabitants, but also 
targeted the cultivated nature of  the countryside. By consuming or destroying 
forage and crop yields, this tactic of  attrition was used, as Lisa Brady has noted 
in the case of  the American Civil War, to sever the connection between the 
rural civilian population, the enemy army and the land on which both depended 
for sustenance on the other.8 It was thought to be possible to starve out an 
enemy and to exercise control over the enemy’s use of  land in a radical way: by 
destroying it.
Examining this aspect of  Early Modern military tactics and its consequences 
for the natural environment as a part of  military knowledge, I aim to contribute 
to fields of  research for environmental historians and historians of  warfare. 
As a synthesis, this environmental history of  warfare focuses not only on the 
environmental impact of  war, but also, as Richard Tucker has pointed out, on 
the ecological settings of  war through history.9 As J. R. McNeill has observed in a 
study on the history of  woods and warfare, scorched earth tactics like destroying 
natural resources are “as old as war itself,” and Emmanuel Kreike underlined the 
importance of  environmental warfare as a colonial war practice in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.10 An examination of  this form of  warfare as a part of  
the emerging theoretical framework on war in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries furthers an understanding of  environmental warfare as a special field 
of  military knowledge. 
The article consists of  three sections. Initially, I sketch an episode of  the 
devastation of  the Palatinate with a focus on the local consequences of  this type 
of  warfare to highlight its impact on civilian use of  land. The efforts of  the 
French armies were intended to ensure not only the demolition of  fortifications 
and towns, but also the consumption of  as much forage as possible. This deprived 
enemy troops and the local population of  a vital natural resource. I then analyze 
the idea of  “ravaging” a region in Early Modern military thought as a legitimate 
8  Brady, “The Wilderness of  War,” 172–79; Brady, “Devouring the Land,” 49–52.
9  Tucker, “The Impact of  Warfare,” 15–16; Tucker, “War and the Environment,” 319–20.
10  McNeill, “Woods and Warfare,” 401. In an extreme form, Emmanuel Kreike called this environmental 
warfare a form of  “ecocide,” citing the example of  Dutch colonial warfare in the nineteenth century. 
However, while Early Modern environmental warfare targeted civilians, it was never comparable to an 
effort systematically to eradicate an entire population or people. See Kreike, “Genocide,” 297–300.
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modus operandi that was addressed in certain contexts. Finally, I briefly examine 
the idea of  protecting the countryside during wartime, as violence against the 
rural population and their local resources was also connected to ideas of  “just 
war” and legitimate versus illegitimate conduct of  warfare. This protection, as I 
will argue, was meant to ensure the effectiveness of  one’s own army and did not 
entail the idea of  a humanization of  warfare; rather, in the discourse of  military 
thought and theory, utilitarian arguments prevailed.
The Hunger for Forage: The Case of  Baden-Baden 1689
Fernand Braudel once called the times before the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of  the consumption of  large amounts of  fossil fuels the “Old 
Biological Regime.”11 One key implication of  this term is its focus on energy 
production: Before large amounts of  energy began to be drawn from the use of  
fossil fuels (an “underground forest,” as Rolf-Peter Sieferle has put it),12 the “Old 
Biological Regime” was mainly bound to organic sources of  energy. Wood for 
fires and food for both man and animals alike were subject to the biological laws 
of  fertility and plant growth. John Landers has described this configuration as an 
“organic economy,” its limitations having a direct impact on the military logistics 
of  pre-industrial Western societies. As Landers suggests, the dependence of  this 
“organic economy” on large rural areas meant that military forces could only 
advance if  armies and military administrations were able to make use of  local 
agricultural resources. Depriving an enemy of  this resource, thus, was often the 
only way to win a war.13
This perspective proves exceptionally interesting if  one considers the ways in 
which Early Modern armies ensured their mobility. Often, it has been noted that 
winter campaigns were uncommon in Early Modern Europe and that warfare 
was typically bound to the seasons, just like agriculture. If  military operations 
dragged on into the harsh winter months,14 this was considered especially 
11  Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 70–72. On the use of  this concept, see Marks, “The (Modern) 
World since 1500,” 58.
12  Sieferle, Der unterirdische Wald.
13  Landers, The Field and the Forge, 70–71; 202–3; 225–26.
14  It should be noted that Early Modern Warfare took place in a special phase of  climate history, the 
Little Ice Age. Especially low temperatures and wet and unstable summers further contributed to the 
famines during wartime. As John Lynn has noted, during the Nine Years’ War, France suffered one of  the 
worst agricultural disasters on record in 1694 and 1695, and this dramatically slowed the French war efforts, 
see Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 241–53. For a concise summary of  the concept of  the Little Ice Age and 
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problematic. One of  the main reasons for this limitation was the dependency 
on forage. Grass growth determined the point of  time armies could leave 
their winter quarters. Without this “fuel,” no army could be expected to move 
anywhere. The cavalry needed a daily portion of  forage to feed their horses, as 
did all the other animals used in convoys for supplies or to transport baggage 
and heavy and expensive siege weapons, which were very important in an age of  
fortress warfare.15 
As John Lynn has argued, drawing on the example of  the French Army, a 
force of  about 60,000 soldiers could easily muster about 40,000 horses, 20,000 
for the cavalry and another 20,000 used for logistical tasks. As the amount of  
forage for troops in winter quarters was quantified in Réglements, it is possible to 
estimate at least the amounts of  dry forage that a body of  troops like this would 
consume on a daily basis. The Réglement of  the French Army in November 1665, 
for example, prescribed a ration of  20 pounds of  hay for each horse. For the 
cavalry alone this would have meant that about 200 tons of  dry forage were 
needed to sustain about 20,000 horses, if  these estimates are accurate.16 The 
problem with forage was that it effectively could not be procured from distant 
regions via carts, as this again would require the use of  horses, which would also 
need to be fed. Dried forage was vital for troops in their winter quarters, but 
the same problems arose as in the case of  fresh forage. Furthermore, it proved 
complicated to dry fresh forage in the field, as it rotted very quickly. Thus, the 
subsistance militaire was divided into food for soldiers and food for animals.
This tactic sheds some light on the core problem of  logistics that was 
connected to military tactics in the Early Modern era. Military strategy and 
military organization changed between the Thirty Years’ War and the French 
Revolution. This can only be briefly covered here: out of  the mercenary armies 
of  the early seventeenth century emerged more or less permanent forces with 
an aristocratic officer class more closely bound to the military hierarchy and the 
authority of  the sovereign; soldiers were gradually subjected to harsher forms 
of  drills, as the ideal tactic of  linear warfare of  the early eighteenth century to 
maximize firepower demanded even greater discipline; the ever-present army 
the research of  leading climate historians Christian Pfister, Hubert Horace Lamb and Rüdiger Glaser, see 
Behringer, Kulturgeschichte des Klimas, 119–22.
15  Tallett, War and Society, 32–33 and 54.
16  See Lynn, Giant, 127–28. Lynn also estimates a total sum of  400 tons of  dry forage for 40,000 horses 
or even 1,000 tons of  green forage, see Lynn, “Food, Funds, and Fortresses,” 141. However, it is important 
to note that not all animals used for supply runs belonged to the armies. Rather, animals for carting food 
and other supplies were often requisitioned from the local rural population.
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“tails,” still known in the early seventeenth century, consisting of  the women and 
children of  mercenaries who occasionally even outnumbered the armed forces, 
declined in the late seventeenth century as the supply of  soldiers increasingly 
became a matter of  a military administration. At the same time, European 
armies experienced a dramatic growth, fostered by changes in recruiting and 
supply practices.17 
The supply of  troops underwent a major transformation since the end of  
the Thirty Years’ War.18 As for the French example, the growth of  the army was 
to a large part only possible because of  reforms under Le Tellier and his son 
Louvois. These reforms were reactions to the increasing problem of  providing 
adequate supplies for a large force without actually having the funds to purchase 
food for the troops directly. By institutionalizing the establishment of  magazines 
using private contractors, the French administration tried to improve army 
supply and reduce damage dealt to the home country. In theory, food could then 
be carted from the magazines towards the field of  operations.19
In contrast to these obvious changes, however, there remained certain key 
problems of  Early Modern warfare. Often, forage had to be obtained in the field 
as a local resource, either by requisition or by purchase.20 “Foraging” was the 
most basic daily routine for armies.21 However, concentrating large quantities of  
dried forage in magazines could also become a major advantage, as this would 
allow an army to take to the fields early. Under Le Tellier and his son Louvois, 
this became one of  the key factors in the quick successes of  the French army 
during the Dutch War, as the troops could draw on substantial stocks of  hay and 
17  For a concise overview of  military tactics from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries see, for 
instance, Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare, 2–14; Tallett, War and Society; Wilson, “Warfare in the Old 
Regime;” Duffy, Military Experience.
18  On the French case see Lynn, Giant, 108–14. On the connection between warfare and the emerging 
state during the Early Modern period, see for example Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 181–86; for 
a critical view of  the notion of  a dominant “fiscal military state,” see Parrott, The Business of  War, 310–27. 
Parrott emphasizes the role of  private contractors as suppliers of  European armies.
19  See Parrott, Business, 310; Creveld, Supplying War, 17–22. However, Crefeld is very critical concerning 
the actual use of  magazines, arguing that most of  the time they actually were used to supply troops in 
garrison, not operating armies. John Lynn argues against this thesis, and he points out that supply for 
soldiers indeed was normally procured via the magazine system, whereas fodder was mostly requisitioned 
locally. Lynn, “Logistics,” 15–21.
20  On this difference, see Lynn, “Logistics,” 19–20.
21  On the importance and complexities of  foraging, see Lund, War for the Every Day, 65–69.
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straw that had been established at major fortresses along the Rhine. The river 
was used to transport the enormous quantities of  forage.22
This shows two main factors that also played a key role during the devastation 
of  the Palatinate. First, forage was one of  the main resources that an army needed 
to keep itself  mobile, and it was also a resource of  which one could deprive 
one’s enemy only by consuming or destroying it. As it was a local resource, the 
availability of  which was bound to its own growth time, keeping an enemy away 
from forage could potentially slow down his operations. Also, a considerable 
advantage was to be obtained if  one could concentrate large amounts of  dried 
forage in magazines. This concentration of  forage could be achieved by drawing 
on contributions from the enemy territory, which were to be paid both in money 
and “in natura.”23 It became common practice to obtain these “contributions” as 
a mixture of  taxes and extortion not only for the French, but for all European 
armies after the Thirty Years’ War, and this remained common practice until 
the end of  the eighteenth century. This method of  sustaining an army in enemy 
territory was a vital part of  financing warfare, and levying contributions was 
legitimate in terms of  military law. The collection of  this “war tax” was relatively 
orderly most of  the time, as commanders even worked together with the civil 
administration of  occupied regions to raise the required sums or the required 
amounts of  foodstuffs and fodder. So-called contributions were often seen, in 
comparison to pillaging and looting, as a lesser evil. If  a town or region failed 
to pay, however, armies could burn villages and towns as a form of  rightful 
punishment.24
Yet, the burning of  the Palatinate in the winter months of  1688 and 1689 
was not done as punishment for failure to pay the increasing sums demanded 
by French intendants. Instead, this common practice provided the pretext for a 
plan that had been designed very early on.
The example of  the fate of  Baden-Baden, a small county south of  the 
Electoral Palatinate which also was partly occupied by French forces and 
compelled to make contributions (as were most territories on the Upper Rhine), 
22  Lynn, “Food, Funds, and Fortresses,” 148.
23  Lynn, “Logistics,” 143–46.
24  Redlich, De Praeda Militari, 44–46 and 66–71. Redlich, however, draws a sharp line between the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, describing the former as a century of  pillaging and the latter 
as the century of  a rather orderly system of  contributions. On the cooperation of  local elites with enemy 
forces in collecting contributions to mitigate possible negative consequences for the territory, see Carl, 
“Restricted Violence,” 122–25.
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sheds light on what this practice meant for civilian populations.25 Demands were 
being made not only for considerable sums of  money, but also for forage to 
supply French troops in their winter quarters. For the territory of  Baden-Baden, 
these demands were sent by Jacques La Grange, who had been the intendant of  
Alsace since 1674 and had served in the Nine Years’ War as the intendant of  
Alsace, Brisgau, and the French army in Germany.26 
In a letter to the Baden-Baden officials written on February 7, 1689, he 
elaborated on the consequences the county would face if  his demands were not 
met. “I have heard that of  the 20,000 rations of  forage, which have been imposed 
on you for our part of  the contribution, you have only paid 600 so far.”27 If  this 
did not change quickly, he threatened to “burn without consideration.”28 Eleven 
days later, La Grange issued yet another official letter to levy new contributions, 
demanding 1,500 sacks of  oats for the cavalry.29
While it was a common practice to draw upon enemy resources to sustain 
one’s own army, especially during winter, the motive in early 1689 was not only 
subsistence. As John Lynn has pointed out, there had been plans to demolish 
not only fortifications, but also towns on the Upper Rhine as early as the 
end of  October 1688. In a letter to Louvois, Chamlay suggested completely 
destroying the town of  Mannheim. In a letter from Louvois to the Lieutenant 
General Joseph de Montclar written on December 18, the Minister of  War 
ordered Montclar to destroy all settlements along the Neckar completely so that 
German troops would find neither food nor forage.30 This included consuming 
or destroying forage before retreating to the left side of  the Rhine, as Montclar 
wrote in an order concerning the French officer Peyssonel in 1688: his troops 
should consume all forage if  possible and burn the rest.31 It is not unlikely 
that this is the context in which the repeated demands for new deliveries of  
substantial amounts of  forage from the county of  Baden-Baden to Strasbourg is 
to be seen: as an attempt to consume the fuel available and establish a logistical 
obstacle for the German forces.
25  Wunder, “Zerstörungswut oder militärische Logik,” 25–26.
26  See Vetter, “Anhang,” in Das Schloß gesprengt, die Stadt verbrannt,” 158.
27  Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (GLAK), 48/3384, letter from La Grange to the Baden-Baden 
councilors, February 7, 1689.
28  Ibid.
29  GLAK 48/3384, letter from La Grange to all officials of  the county of  Baden-Baden, February 
18, 1689.
30  Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 196.
31  Lynn, Giant, 129.
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This tactic seemed to work, as reports by Baden-Baden councilors to Count 
Hermann of  Baden-Baden in Regensburg suggest.32 In a report dated to January 
24, 1689, an official wrote about destruction around the town of  Pforzheim, but 
also about raiding parties that took forage and grains. The “conservation of  the 
country” was at risk, as many of  the subjects had already fled the surrounding 
countryside.33 To ease the burden of  contributions, especially that of  providing 
forage, a letter directly addressed to La Grange himself34 tried to dissuade the 
French official from demanding copious amounts of  hay and straw: “The supply 
of  grains and forages is absolutely impossible, as it is completely consumed by 
the billeting and continued passages of  the royal troops.”35 According to the 
letter, the financial and ecological limits of  the small territory had been reached, 
and during winter it was simply not possible to grow more forage. 
One could contend that these sources are not entirely reliable, since the 
councilors and officials may have exaggerated the situation in Baden-Baden to 
persuade the French to relieve the burdens of  war or to persuade Hermann of  
Baden-Baden to force the Reichstag in Regensburg to respond to the French 
more quickly. However, another document supports the conclusion that the 
description of  the situation given by the councilors in their reports was accurate. 
In a record dated March 24, 1689, several Baden-Baden officials discussed the 
next response to the growing French threat.36 Even though the governor of  
Strasbourg Count Chamily had given an order allowing the contribution in 
forage to be paid in money, the councilors found this obligation impossible 
to meet. In addition, the document illustrates the growing sufferings endured 
by the civilian population and the damage done to their methods of  land use. 
Again, they wrote that “a large share of  fruits and forage” had already been 
consumed “in natura,” and soon there would be nothing left. Many subjects, they 
contended, had fled the territory because of  famine, and the lack of  forage had 
32  Hermann of  Baden-Baden was the Uncle of  the well-known General and ruling Count of  Baden-
Baden Ludwig Wilhelm of  Baden-Baden. Hermann of  Baden-Baden was Principalcommissarius at the 
Reichstag in Regensburg as of  1688. In this position, he seems to have been interested in the development 
of  the new war against Louis XIV, and he received continuous reports about the developments in the 
county. See Kleinschmidt, “Hermann, Markgraf  von Baden,” 120–22.
33  GLAK 48/3384, report of  officials of  the County Baden-Baden to Count Hermann of  Baden-
Baden, January 24, 1689.
34  This letter is only preserved as a copy without signature; in his answers, La Grange addressed a 
“madame.”
35  GLAK 48/3384, copy of  a letter to La Grange.
36  GLAK 48/3384, concept of  several officials and councilors of  the County of  Baden-Baden, March 
24, 1689.
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led to the slaughter of  a large part of  the remaining cattle.37 As the subjects had 
neither grain nor forage left, they could hardly sell them to meet the demands 
in money.
While this kind of  shortage was common if  an enemy army was present in 
a territory, the authors linked it to the tactic of  consuming everything so that 
German commanders would find nothing with which to feed their troops and 
mounts, even though this hardly made any sense to them. As they wrote, the 
French insisted on their demands “even though the German troops quartered 
in this county do not get their supplies from our land…”38 Thus, the shortage 
was to some degree artificial and intentional, a tool of  war meant to constrain 
German forces.
This brief  example shows the importance of  a local resource like forage 
in keeping an army supplied, a resource that was “natural” because it followed 
its own biological mechanisms and rhythms.39 While military organization and 
tactics gradually changed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this 
factor remained a critical logistical problem that was examined writings on 
military theory. If  all dried forage had been consumed in a region during winter, 
there was simply no other solution than to wait for fresh grass to grow again 
or to engage in large-scale logistics operation, procuring large quantities of  hay 
and straw via rivers. Also, this understand of  the importance of  forage and the 
shortage of  it in a given territory clarifies the meaning of  the term “logistic 
obstacle.” By consuming (or destroying) this necessary fuel, the army directly 
impacted the use of  local land, the inhabitants of  which needed forage, for 
example, to keep cattle. This shortage, together with the burning of  villages and 
all sorts of  violence against the civilian population, drove the subjects from the 
territory. This in turn meant that in some areas, there was nobody left to cultivate 
the land so it would again yield grains or forage, thus making it difficult to supply 
an army in the region.40 This impact on land use by a large military force was 
not always accidental, nor was it always a result of  faulty organization. Rather, 
sometimes it was used as a way of  depriving an enemy of  supplies. This warfare 
37  Ibid.
38  Ibid.
39  For a theoretical approach on defining nature as a problematic notion in historical research see 
Schatzki, “Nature and Technology in History,” 85–86.
40  The idea of  the population as a work force that ensured the “fertility” of  the land and thus provided 
the essentials for supplying an army was common in Early Modern military theory. See for example Santa 
Cruz de Marcenado, Reflexions, vol. 12, 7. 
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of  attrition, which has been seen as characteristic of  the wars under Louis XIV,41 
was widely discussed in contemporary military thought, both before and after 
the reign of  the sun king.
“Ravaging” a Country as a Part of  Military Thought
The devastation of  the Palatinate also became a topic in Early Modern military 
theory. One example is Hanns Friedrich von Flemings “Der vollkommene 
Teutsche Soldat,” an encyclopedic effort to summarize the state of  the art of  
war in the early eighteenth century. The author placed particular emphasis on the 
wars of  Louis XIV and the destruction wreaked in the course of  these wars. This 
included burning down houses, poisoning wells, and desecrating graves, actions 
that were seen as a violation of  the “divine law or the law of  nations.”42 Flemings’ 
accusations repeat claims found in leaflets in which the French conduct of  war 
was presented as scandalous. However, it is telling that he used this example 
in a chapter in which he discussed the theory of  a “just war” and laws during 
wartime in general. In this context (of  course from a German perspective), 
French actions served as an example of  misconduct.
Flemings’ compilation also shows the specific nature of  military discourse 
of  the period. In the appendix, he included a list of  examples of  “soldiers who 
distinguished themselves both by sword and scholarship.”43 The list was meant to 
illustrate one of  Flemings’ key points, which he made clear on various occasions 
in his work: officers should educate themselves to master the art of  war.
This points towards an emerging new ideal of  educated officers and the 
idea that war itself  could be controlled and systematized by reducing it to certain 
basic principles. As Azar Gat and other scholars of  the “military enlightenment” 
wrote, military thought did not remain untouched by processes and currents in the 
general spirit of  the age, which has been dubbed (at least by its European heirs) 
the “Enlightenment” and the “Age of  Reason.”44 The doctrine of  natural law 
combined with a general search for rules and principles in the arts, together with 
the “gospel of  Newtonian science,”45 created a particular intellectual atmosphere. 
41  Lynn, “Food, Funds, and Fortresses,” 137–38.
42  Fleming, Teutsche Soldat, 95.
43  Ibid., 698. 
44  In general, see Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung; Hazard, Die Herrschaft der Vernunft; Koselleck, 
Kritik und Krise; Gay, The Enlightenment.
45  Gat, Origins, 26.
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However, many modern scholars of  the Enlightenment argue that this cannot 
be summed up as a “revolution” or the personal project of  few “enlightened” 
thinkers, but rather as a large-scale process of  losing and questioning traditional 
orders and thus a resulting concentration of  communication.46 
The study of  these general principles of  warfare and sharing them with 
young officers and interested amateurs alike were key factors in the establishment 
of  “military science” and a “military enlightenment.”47 Ever since Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s “Dell’Arte della Guerra” (1521), a new genre of  printed texts 
emerged that focused on how to wage war, primarily drawing on examples 
borrowed from Ancient authors like Vegetius, Caesar, and Onasander.48 It has 
been argued that the influence of  Antiquity on military treaties remained very high 
until the end of  the eighteenth century, with most authors following technically 
outdated formations and ideals of  warfare, with only few exceptions.49 While 
it is indeed true that Ancient authors, primarily Vegetius but also Caesar’s “De 
Bello Gallico,” were frequently referenced in nearly all works on the art of  war 
of  the period, it is also important to consider the changes to the discourse on 
military theory during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Gradually, 
writings about European warfare came to adopt a more skeptical perspective 
that emphasized the experiences of  the authors and made references to recent 
events, especially after the Seven Years’ War, while occasionally drawing on the 
authorities of  Antiquity.50 As a genre, writings on the Art of  War tried to give 
the reader examples of  the best practices in nearly every field of  military life, 
making the knowledge of  the Ancients and the knowledge of  great commanders 
available, but also commenting on it in an increasingly reflective manner. 
Despite Flemings’ harsh judgment concerning the destruction wreaked by 
the French, there indeed was a place in this discourse for the planned devastation 
of  a country by an army through the destruction of  forage and harvests. Thus, 
the French officials drew on an idea that was already present in military thought 
and remained part of  it even after the Nine Years’ War. A French example 
that was written before the outbreak of  the Nine Years’ War and was broadly 
published and read illustrates this. 
46  Fulda, “Gab es ‘die Aufklärung,’” 22–25; Bödecker, “Aufklärung als Kommunikationsprozess,” 91–
92; Füssel, “Aufklärung,” 280; Pečar and Tricoire, Falsche Freunde, 11–27.
47  Gat, Origins, 25–27; Hohrath, “Spätbarocke Kriegspraxis,” 28–29; Hohrath, “Die Beherrschung des 
Krieges,” 373–79.
48  Gat, Origins, 1–9.
49  Beatrice Heuser, Den Krieg denken, 99–107; Creveld, The Art of  War, 73.
50  Neill, “Ancestral Voices,” 516–20.
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Henri II, the duke of  Rohan, was one of  the most reputable French 
authors on military theory of  the seventeenth century. Born in 1579 to an old 
and powerful protestant family, de Rohan served in campaigns against Spanish 
forces in Flanders under King Henry IV. Due to his close relationship to 
the king, Rohan could hope to rise rapidly into the highest circles of  power. 
However, the assassination of  Henry IV in 1610 shattered his hopes, and soon 
he found himself  the leader of  protestant resistance in France and in opposition 
to the ruling Marie de’ Medici and Louis XIII. In the following uprising of  
the Huguenots, Henri de Rohan played a key role in repeatedly defeating larger 
royalist forces until the peace of  Alès in 1629. He was then ordered by Louis 
XIII to become his ambassador in the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft. There, he fought a 
campaign in Valtellina in an offshoot of  the Thirty Years’ War. He was mortally 
wounded at the siege of  Rheinfelden in 1638, were he had fought in the army of  
Bernhard of  Saxe-Weimar.51
In 1636, Henri de Rohan published a translated extract from Julius Caesar’s 
“De Bello Gallico,” “Le Parfaict Capitaine.” Combined with this however, Rohan 
published his own “Traité particulier de la Guerre” in which he sought to adjust 
the “good maxims” of  the Ancients to the new art of  war.52 In his treatise, he 
wrote that he wanted to show that “despite the difference in our arms to those 
of  the Ancients, we should not ignore their orders.”53 The reference to Antiquity 
was his main source on which he drew for illustrations.
However, Henri de Rohan was also a practitioner of  warfare in the early 
seventeenth century, which bore witness to the rising importance of  siege 
warfare. In the chapter dedicated to defending a country against enemies, he 
addressed the question of  the proportion of  fortresses to an army in the field to 
defend a territory. At this point, he also wrote about the tactic of  wearing out an 
enemy by entrenching large garrisons in strong fortresses. He warned that this 
would threaten the land itself, as it would be desolated by the besieging armies. 
Without a force to counter the besiegers, “you put the means to keep an army 
in the field at risk; and the damage to two or three harvests will put your neck 
in the noose.”54
Nonetheless, a few pages later, Henri de Rohan explicitly suggests laying 
waste to the lands. If  a territory is attacked by a larger force, there is only one 
51  See Hubler, “Rohan, Henri de.”
52  This part was also copied and translated into German. See Rohan, Erfahrner Capitain.
53  Rohan, Parfaict Capitaine, preface.
54  Ibid., 357.
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option: “consume the enemy [consommer l’enemy]”55 and cut off  his food supply: 
“In this case, it is necessary to leave the country and burn all sustenance which you 
cannot contain in your fortresses, and also all towns and villages that you cannot 
defend: because it is better to defend oneself  in a ruined land than to conserve it 
for the enemy.”56 According to his reasoning as a practitioner of  warfare during 
the Thirty Years’ War, destroying forage and harvests and displacing the local 
population (even if  it were one’s “own” population) were legitimate means of  
starving out an enemy, justified by the reference to the common good.
Henri de Rohan’s works were widely published and translated, and many 
authors of  the later seventeenth and eighteenth century alluded to his “Le 
Parfaict Capitaine” as an influential treaty on warfare, mainly a work which 
offered a better understanding of  warfare in Antiquity.57 This does not mean, 
however, that Rohan was the inventor of  this tactic, nor was he the only author 
suggesting its use. In fact, other contemporary authors had similar views. Many 
quoted the famous Roman author Vegetius as the main Antique authority on 
warfare:58 in his general rules of  war he wrote that “everything that is of  use for 
you harms your enemy; everything that is of  use for him is harmful to you.”59 
According to this logic, it was “a great deed to fight your enemy with hunger 
rather than with the sword.”60 This, together with Henri de Rohan’s work, shows 
that laying waste to a region and destroying or consuming forage and food were 
well-established elements of  military strategy before the Nine Years’ War.
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that many authors still supported this 
tactic after the Nine Years’ War, partly drawing on their experiences in that 
conflict. Even though the reputation of  Louis XIV suffered because of  the 
burning of  the Palatinate, which also failed to bring the war to a quick end, the 
approach of  devastating a region which should be defended remained part of  
various treatises.
55  Ibid., 360.
56  Ibid., 361.
57  Even in 1773, the German officer and influential military writer Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai 
mentioned de Rohan’s work and recommended it because it offered a more nuanced understanding of  
Caesar’s approach to warfare. Nicolai, Grundriss, 263.
58  Heuser, Krieg denken, 98–107. Heuser, however, sees the references to Ancient authors like Vegetius 
as nearly absolute until the end of  the eighteenth century. For a critical perspective, see Neill, “Ancestral 
Voices,” 516–20.
59  Vegetius, Abriß des Militärwesens, 175.
60  Ibid., 179.
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One telling example is that of  the French nobleman and officer Antoine 
de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières. Born in 1648, Feuquières served in nearly all the 
wars of  Louis XIV. During the Nine Years’ War, he commanded a regiment and 
contributed to the French victory at Neerwinden in 1693.61 He was also one 
of  the French officers who led raids deep into German territory, demanding 
large sums of  contributions. After the Nine Years’ War, Feuquières fell from 
Louis’ grace, and the War of  Spanish Succession was launched without him as a 
member of  the king’s army.62 During this time, he wrote his memoirs, in which 
he commented (often in a harshly critical manner) on many operations that had 
been led by French and German officers.
His work was published in 1711, the year of  his death, and it instantly 
became a popular lecture as the various reprints and translations into English and 
German suggest. Again, in his chapter dealing with defensive wars, Feuquières 
concerned himself  with the possibilities of  waging war against an enemy that 
had invaded a territory by surprise. It was “very difficult to prescribe, by general 
maxims, how to wage this war.”63 But as a general maxim, Feuquières again 
suggested that the countryside should not be spared: “The rural countryside 
should not be conserved. It is imperative that one take everything possible into 
the best fortresses and consume, even by fire, all grains and forage which one 
cannot take to a safe place, as to diminish the subsistence of  the enemy army.”64 
Local resources that were not controlled by one’s own troops were a threat to 
the region and to one’s own army. Thus, if  necessary, they were to be destroyed. 
The phrase “even by fire” suggests that simply burning everything was a matter 
of  last resort, however. Preferably, forage and grains were to be consumed.
Even after considerable time, this rationale of  disrupting land use to deplete 
local natural resources was an element in the discourse of  military theory. The time 
of  the great encyclopedias, which were meant to gather and systematize all forms 
of  knowledge for the use of  mankind (most prominently, the “Encyclopédie” 
of  Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert) also saw a fair share 
of  efforts to put together encyclopedias and dictionaries specializing in military 
knowledge.65 One of  the best-known examples is the “Dictionnaire Militaire” 
61  “Feuquières, Antoine de Pas, marquis de,” 662.
62  Ibid.
63  Feuquières, Memoires, 2.
64  Ibid., 3.
65  Hohrath, “Die Beherrschung des Krieges,” 373; on encyclopedias in general, see Schneider and 
Zedelmaier, “Wissensapparate,” 349–50.
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by German officer and engineer Jacob von Eggers. Eggers was born in 1708 
and was active in the Swedish service, where he received an education in military 
engineering and the building of  fortifications. In 1737, he joined the army of  
Saxony. During the War of  the Austrian Succession, Eggers fought on the side 
of  the Saxon army, securing river crossings by building field fortifications. After 
the war, Eggers was promoted to the serve as the head of  the Saxon corps of  
engineers. He became the educator of  the princes of  Saxony and was admitted 
to the Swedish Academy of  Sciences. In 1751, he published his “Dictionnaire 
Militaire.” Until his death in 1773, Eggers was mainly the commanding officer of  
the city of  Gdańsk (Danzig), where he built up an impressive library specializing 
in military science.66 
Eggers was the prototype of  the “enlightened” officer: well-educated (partly 
due to his specialization in military engineering) but also with experience in the 
field. His efforts as a military writer and collector of  books on military science 
make him one “of  the educated officers of  the eighteenth century who laid the 
foundation for the rationalization of  warfare,” as Daniel Hohrath puts it.67 Still, 
in his dictionary there is an entry for “to ravage [ravagiren]”: “ravage, is the act 
of  troops ravaging a province or region where they cannot hold out against an 
enemy by burning and pillaging and taking everything with them if  possible.”68 
In his entry concerning the “le plat pais” (the rural countryside), Eggers noted 
that it was common to lay waste to most of  these kinds of  lands due to problems 
with discipline or due to enemy raids.69 It is striking that for Eggers, the option 
of  “ravaging” a country was not bound to war on friendly territory, but yet was a 
defensive measure that deserved to be mentioned in his dictionary, thus making 
this tactic a codified part of  military knowledge. However, the idea of  desolating 
an area to gain advantages remained an element of  military knowledge that was 
repeatedly mentioned in writings on the subject until the end of  the eighteenth 
century.70
The destruction of  the countryside was justified as a defensive measure that 
was meant to ultimately protect the “common good,” even though nearly all of  
the authors in question mentioned this tactic in reference to friendly territory. If  
an enemy army would otherwise use a resource to its own benefit, it was better 
66  Hohrath, “Jacob von Eggers,” 99–101.
67  Ibid.
68  von Eggers, Ritter-Lexicon, vol. 2, 559.
69  Ibid, 23.
70  See for instance Bessel, Entwurf, 9.
HHR_2018-3_KÖNYV.indb   525 12/4/2018   2:59:39 PM
526
Hungarian Historical Review 7,  no. 3  (2018): 510–540
to destroy it and to deprive him of  this opportunity. Thus, exercising control 
over the use of  local resources was the main motive. What is important in the 
case of  each of  these examples is the way in which military land use and civilian 
land use were related to each other. To all military writers, the primary focus lay 
on the use of  the rural countryside for the armies. Food and especially forage 
were broadly mentioned as targets along villages, resources that could be of  
direct use to anyone controlling a territory. By consuming or destroying as much 
as possible, one could at least keep the enemy at a safe distance while harming 
him indirectly due to the lack of  supplies. Also, the use of  fortresses as key 
factors of  resource mobilization becomes clear. This tactic was related to the 
fact that campaigns were fought following the seasons. Depriving an enemy of  
sustenance was confined locally and possibly lasted until the following spring, 
but this meant that it lasted until the next campaign. Thus, it could be used to 
exert at least some degree of  control over the movement of  the enemy army 
and its use of  local resources. If  a region simply could not sustain an army any 
longer, it was unlikely that the region would be the next theatre of  operations. 
The displacement of  the local population could worsen the situation, as locals 
were needed to cultivate the land and to harvest grains and forage.71 However, 
there also were instances of  authors arguing against the idea of  devastating the 
land. Their arguments reveal the utilitarian point of  view that was prevalent in 
military theory regarding the destruction of  the rural countryside and natural 
resources.
Conserving Local Resources as Military Rationality
In fact, there was a prominent reference in one of  the most important texts 
on international law to both the destruction and the conservation of  local, 
natural resources. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who is often considered 
one of  the founders of  international law and the law of  war, also dealt with 
the damage done to the countryside during conflicts. In his “De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis” from 1625, Grotius made a considerable contribution to the discussion 
of  the theory of  a “just war” and “just warfare,” drawing on scholastic and 
humanist traditions. Devised by St. Augustine of  Hippo in the fifth century 
and St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, the theory of  “just” war 
71  On this contemporary emphasis on the local population as an important element in the provision of  
resources for armies operating in an area, see for instance Santa Cruz, Reflexions, vol. 12, 7.
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played a vital role as a background for international laws of  war for the whole 
Early Modern period. While the area of  the jus ad bellum addressed the causes to 
declare war, the category of  jus in bellum regulated the conduct of  warfare. The 
theory of  just causes for war, however, outlawed wars of  aggression or out of  
motives like greed, expansion, and the like and emphasized that war was to be 
used as a means of  reestablishing order against a perpetrator.
While this setting of  laws and rules worked well as legitimization for 
campaigns against non-Christian enemies and “outlaws” (like bands of  criminals 
or marauders),72 this focus on just causes was subjected to scrutiny by Gentili 
and Grotius. The question of  what was, precisely, a “just” cause for war had 
become problematic. The notion of  sovereignty proposed by Hobbes and 
Bodin meant that the emerging state was regarded as the only legitimate actor 
that could rightfully set rules and use force to establish them. Thus, conflict 
between two states posed a problem, as both parties claimed to have “just” 
causes for their military actions. In this problematic setting, Gentili and later 
Grotius emphasized the ius in bellum as regulation of  the conduct of  warfare; 
while war was accepted as a way of  settling disputes between two sovereigns, the 
notion of  ius in bellum at least offered some hope of  mitigating its worst effects.73
In this context, Grotius addressed the question of  damage done to cultivated 
natural resources.74 In the twelfth chapter of  the third book in “De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis,” he explicitly wrote about the importance of  moderation when it came to 
efforts to “desolate or ravage the enemy country.”75 Firstly, Grotius noted that the 
destruction of  the “fruits of  the land” was not necessarily an illegitimate tactic. 
As he explained, destroying land and the goods of  an enemy was not unjust if  
the destruction was necessary. Alluding to Ancient authorities like Polybius and 
Onasander, he stated: “A general will remember to desolate an enemy’s land and 
to burn it to devastate it; because if  the enemy is lacking the fruits of  the land 
and money, the war will be halted […] So desolation is permitted if  it can force 
the enemy to make peace quickly.”76 But as he mentioned, this kind of  desolation 
happened “commonly out of  wrath and resentment or out of  the desire for 
bounty”77 rather than for strategic reasons.
72  Bennett, “Legality and legitimacy,” 265–70; Tuck, The Rights of  War and Peace, 78–79.
73  Schröder, “Sine fide nulla pax,” 37–38; Schröder, “Natural Law,” 204–18; Pröve, “Vom ius ad bellum 
zum ius in bello,” 264–68.
74  See also the remarks of  Stone, “The Environment in Wartime,” 16–18.
75  Grotius, Drey Bücher von Kriegs= und Friedens=Rechten, 168.
76  Ibid., 169–70.
77  Ibid., 170.
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However, Grotius also explicitly stated that there were indeed limits on 
the justifications for attacking natural resources. Referring again to writers of  
Antiquity like Plato, he illustrated that devastating a country was not necessary 
in most cases. If  an army had already occupied an enemy territory so that 
the enemy “cannot use the fruits of  it,”78 this was a reason for sparing the 
countryside. Furthermore, Grotius mentioned “divine law,” which compelled 
armies attacking cities to use only the “wild trees” for earthworks and to spare 
the “fertile trees,” because “the trees cannot rise up against us and give battle.”79 
Quoting the Jewish philosopher Philo of  Alexandria, Grotius wanted to spare 
“fertile fields” for the same reasons: “Why do you want to vent your anger on 
inanimate things, which are themselves gentle by nature, and bear fruits?”80
The example of  Grotius shows two important arguments that provide some 
theoretical context for the deliberate destruction of  the countryside as part of  
military campaigns and strategy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
On the one hand, Grotius argued that special necessities could arise in warfare 
that made destroying forage or harvests a viable tactical option. On the other, 
however, this argument of  necessity meant that any act of  destruction that was 
“unnecessary and useless” was illegitimate. If  the enemy could not reasonably 
be expected to gain any use from the resources because he had no control over 
them, then there was no legitimate reason to destroy them. Interesting is the 
specific mention of  fruit-bearing trees, which are used as an example. With this 
reference to Ancient authors, Grotius condemned the useless destruction of  
resources that needed a lot of  time to regrow, meaning that destroying them was 
not simply a matter of  gaining an advantage during a war, but was also a means 
of  inflicting damage that was out of  proportion. 
Several military writers brought up this argument of  utility, especially since 
the beginning of  the eighteenth century. One example is the well-known French 
military writer Jean Charles, Chevalier de Folard. Born in 1669 to a clerical 
noble family in Avignon, Folard received his education at a Jesuit college. His 
first experience of  the military was under the command of  Duras in the fall 
campaign of  1688, precisely in the context of  the Nine Years’ War and the 
destruction of  the Palatinate. Later, he fought under the Swedish king Charles 
XII, where he started to develop his own system of  military thought during his 
time at Stockholm. As an expert on classical Roman and Greek warfare, Folard 
78  Ibid.
79  Ibid.
80  Ibid., 171.
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tried to draw on Antiquity while at the same time presenting a new system of  
military theory derived from Classical sources. In his “Nouvelles Découvertes 
sur la guerre, dans une dissertation sur Polybe” and his “Histoire de Polybe,” he 
made contributions to many spheres of  Early Modern military thought, one of  
the most controversial being the idea of  using the formation of  columns as a 
form of  attack.81
Despite his sometimes seemingly eccentric ideas, he was not an “armchair 
general.” He had served in the French and Swedish armies and had participated 
in several campaigns. In his “Histoire de Polybe,” Folard commented on 
contemporary examples of  warfare. In fact, other authors repeatedly quote him 
not for his disputed ideas concerning column tactics but for his original thoughts 
on war in mountains, the “coup d’oeil” in warfare, and for his critical approach, 
which emphasized the search for general principals in war.82 He also wrote on 
the question of  destroying forage and harvests.
While he at one point explicitly quoted Vegetius with reference to his maxim 
of  starving an enemy by burning forage as “admirable,”83 he later criticized this 
practice. While devastating one’s own territory seemed like a necessary evil, 
Folard deemed destroying enemy territory as unnecessary and ineffective. Here, 
he quoted Raimondo Montecuccoli, one of  the most important Habsburg 
generals of  the seventeenth century:84 “The raids of  armies or a large part of  
troops into enemy territory do not yield any advantage if  they are not part of  
a considerable operation: because nothing is better suited to ruin an army. This 
kind of  enterprise, which consists solely in ravaging and doing damage far away 
from a border, is hardly useful […] If  we have no other intent than to destroy a 
certain portion of  land, one deprives oneself  of  contributions one could collect. 
[…] These kinds of  invasions are not useful except for during the time of  the 
harvest, and this is precisely the time which should be chosen […].”85
81  Gat, Origins, 28; Chagniot, Chevalier de Folard, 13–29.
82  See for example Töllner, Bildung, 118; Zanthier, Versuch über die Märsche, 110; Pirscher, Coup d’oeil, 18. 
Frederic the Great and Maurice de Saxe both took interest in Folards writings as well, see Starkey, War, 
36–37.
83  Folard, Histoire, vol. 4, 148.
84  Montecuccoli, Kriegs-Nachrichten, 214. Montecuccoli played a major role in the Imperial army of  the 
seventeenth century and fought in the Thirty Years’ War, the Nordic War, and the Dutch War; also, he 
was one of  the most important generals to fight in the wars against the Ottoman Empire. His treatise on 
warfare became a reference work in the eighteenth century. On Montecuccoli, see Gat, Origins, 13–24.
85  Folard, Histoire, vol. 5, 237.
HHR_2018-3_KÖNYV.indb   529 12/4/2018   2:59:39 PM
530
Hungarian Historical Review 7,  no. 3  (2018): 510–540
These remarks show that the decision to burn forage and harvests or at least 
to consume them to gain an advantage implicitly included civil land use, as his 
suggestion concerning the proper season for an attack suggests. However, two 
factors made this tactic unfavorable. First, the advantage gained by destroying 
forage only lasted for a short while, and it furthermore only worked at the 
expense of  the rural population. It was not necessarily compassion for the fate 
of  displaced and impoverished peasants that made Folard disdain this tactic; 
rather, he argued from an utilitarian perspective. Exploiting the population by 
demanding contributions (which, as pointed out before, were also paid in natura) 
promised far greater incomes in the end. Remarks that went into detail concerning 
compassion for the local population or, simply, addressed humanitarian concerns 
were not decisive. Rather, this emphasis on the importance of  conserving natural 
resources and sparing the local population originated in a military rationality that 
emphasized the role of  the enemy countryside as an economic factor.
This economic argument, which rested on the idea of  necessity and the 
proportionality of  force, was raised in works by other authors.86 The idea that 
enemy territory should be conserved not only as a possible territorial gain after 
the war but also as a possible theatre of  operations for future campaigns is 
echoed in several writings, but it was always part of  the effort to ensure military 
effectiveness. As such, it can be seen as analogous to the shift from irregular 
looting to the rather orderly process of  collecting contributions and the efforts 
to outlaw looting in general in order to avoid driving off  the local population, 
which proved vital as a workforce for any army in a region.
However, it is important to note that the authors of  works on military 
theory saw looting and ravaging the lands as concepts that were related but 
not essentially the same. Ravaging the land meant targeting the enemy’s rural 
infrastructure and local resources in a planned and orderly fashion, while looting 
was the outright loss of  all discipline. In practice, of  course, the two could not 
be so clearly or easily separated. As John Lynn has put it, it was scarcely possible 
to order a soldier to burn down a farm and at the same time prevent him from 
simply taking everything that was inside or abusing the inhabitants.87 The option 
of  destroying a region that could not be protected against an enemy remained 
a discussed and viable option until the end of  the eighteenth century,88 but it 
86  For instance, see Santa Cruz, Reflexions, vol. 4, 164 and 173, and vol. 12, 7.
87  As noted by Lynn, Wars of  Louis XIV, 198.
88  For instance, see Bessel, Entwurf, 9 or Burtenbach, Betrachtungen, 14, although von Burtenbach is 
critical of  the burning of  the Palatinate.
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slowly came under scrutiny after the Seven Years’ War, as two final examples 
illustrate.
When the English officer and engineer Henry Lloyd issued his “Military 
Memoirs” in 1781, he also touched on the subject of  conserving enemy territory. 
Lloyd, who has come to be known as one of  the most important military 
theorists of  the second half  of  the eighteenth century alongside the French 
officer Guibert, had a long history of  military service. Born presumably in 1720, 
Lloyd got his education at the Oxford Jesus College, where he acquired a high 
degree of  skill in geometry and cartography.89 Having left England in 1741, 
Lloyd served with the French during the War of  the Austrian Succession. After 
having caught the attention of  Maurice de Saxe during the battle of  Fontenoy 
(1745), Lloyd was recommended to different generals as a skilled engineer and 
officer, and he served in Prussian, French, Austrian, and Russian armies before 
returning to England.
His “The History of  the Late War in Germany,” in which he described his 
experiences and the general setting of  the Seven Years’ War, became widely 
known and read. In his “Military Memoirs,” this experienced and educated 
soldier also wrote about the habit of  detaching forces from the main army to 
raid a country: “To force the enemy to battle, or to the clearing of  the land, one 
naturally has to put the whole force to use together, and one may not occupy 
oneself  with detachments, raids, or similar: because this weakens the army; the 
detachments risk being cut off, and they devastate the country that one has to 
preserve if  one wants to stay there.”90 In this rather general remark, which made 
no direct mention of  the old practice of  burning forage, Lloyd emphasized the 
later use of  a region by one’s own army as an argument against devastating an 
area by detaching too many troops. However, his formulation “if  you want to 
stay there” suggests that this was generally bound to strategic plans rather than 
to moral imperatives. Few authors identified the “ravaging” of  a countryside as 
something that was generally unwanted and morally deplorable. 
One of  the authors who commented on this practice in a critical manner was 
the French lieutenant-colonel Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy. He was a recognized 
student of  warfare in Antiquity and due to this was admitted to the French Royal 
Academy of  belles-lettres. But he also became known as a military writer himself, 
having published his “Cours de tactique” in 1766, which was reprinted twice 
89  Speelman, Henry Lloyd, 5–7; Starkey, War, 56–63.
90  Henry Lloyd, Abhandlung über die allgemeinen Grundsätze, 120.
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and translated into German in 1767. In 1777, he  completed his work on tactics 
with his “Théorie de la Guerre.”91 In this, he scorned the light cavalry and troops 
of  the “small war,” such as Hussars, Croats, and Pandures, who were employed 
excessively during the Seven Years’ War by both the Austrian and the Prussian 
armies. His disdain for these kinds of  troops was prompted in part by the fact 
that the “small war” waged by raiding parties of  light troops basically consisted 
of  forays in the course of  which these troops “ravaged” the areas.92 For Paul-
Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy, though, this constituted a considerable disadvantage 
for both armies and was a feature of  a “barbaric” way of  war: “and this apparent 
advantage can even turn against him, if  one abandons the devastated land. In 
general, this barbaric manner of  waging war is detrimental to both parties.”93 He 
had moral disdain for the practice of  “ravaging” a country as barbaric, and this 
sentiment explains in part his criticism of  the widespread use of  light troops.
The practice of  laying waste to the countryside was often summed up 
with the term “ravaging” or “ravager,” but the explicit mentioning of  burning 
forage or harvests gradually declined in the writings by military theorists until 
the end of  the eighteenth century, which could be interpreted as a form of  
marginalization in the discourse. Still, even if  the tactic of  destroying villages and 
local resources and the pillaging and displacement of  the population gradually 
became something the authors were more inclined to discourage, the reasons for 
this were almost always utilitarian. In their writings, they rarely expressed pity 
for suffering peasants. Rather, it was important to point out that one’s own army 
might suffer dire consequences if  lands were made “sterile” and “unfertile” by 
war.
Conclusion
The tactic of  depriving an enemy of  local natural resources by consuming or 
destroying them was part of  Early Modern military thought. This tactic was 
intended not simply to reduce or eliminate supplies for the enemy army. Rather, 
it also targeted local populations and their use of  land as a way of  creating 
artificial shortages of  food and forage. When and how to “ravage” a country was 
discussed in various texts that dealt with the theory of  how to wage war in the 
91  Gat, Origins, 39.
92  Carl, “Restricted Violence,” 125–28; Martin Rink, “Die noch ungezähmte Bellona,” 168–87.
93  Maizeroy, Théorie, 291.
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this discourse, four factors stand out as 
main motives and categories of  thought.
First, in order for efforts to destroy forage and harvests and “ruin” a country 
to be seen as legitimate, they had to be presented as necessary. This notion 
of  necessity was often based on Ancient axioms of  warfare or arguments in 
favor of  “shortening” a war. Second, however, it seems to have been extremely 
important where this tactic was used. Military thinkers explicitly wrote about 
this tactic of  “scorched earth warfare” in the context of  enemy invasions 
that were unforeseen or simply overwhelming. In these cases, desolating one’s 
own country was discussed as a defensive method to starve out an enemy. 
Paradoxically, these same thinkers tended to suggest that enemy territory should 
be treated carefully, as it was more practical to extort contributions, a perspective 
that somewhat economized military land use. Third, to some degree the authors 
explicitly assessed which resources should be targeted and why. “Devastating” 
the countryside meant that not only villages were burned, but also forage and 
harvests, which were seen as directly useful for the enemy troops. However, as 
Grotius suggested, there were limits to this logic. Trees, for example, were never 
mentioned in the context of  “ravaging” a country and starving out an enemy. 
Forage could be grown again for subsequent campaigns, but cutting down useful 
trees was seen as a form of  lasting damage.94 Fourth, the factors of  duration 
and effectiveness played a role in the reflections of  the authors. Some of  them 
considered the usefulness of  “devastation” by raiding parties as minimal and 
something that did not last long enough to be worthwhile. In addition, again 
the practice of  extorting contributions promised a more effective source of  
income in the end. These arguments of  utility were used to criticize the tactic 
of  “scorched earth warfare” and the “ravaging” of  the countryside, while the 
authors on military theory seldom touched on humanitarian concerns.
While I have focused in this article on ideas and categories prevalent in 
military thought, it is also important to consider that the practical side of  warfare 
often followed its own rationalities. Often, the devastation of  the countryside 
was not the effect of  a conscious decision by generals or officers, but a 
consequence of  mismanagement and logistical shortages. Even in the middle 
of  the eighteenth century, these kinds of  problems could lead to armies doing 
substantial damage to the countryside, as the aftermath of  the Battle of  Warburg 
94  It is important to note, however, that this sentiment explicitly was bound to the notion of  “fertile” 
and “useful” trees. If  trees and forests could constitute a tactical disadvantage, many authors did not 
hesitate to recommend that they be destroyed. For example, see Folard, Histoire, vol. 3, 287.
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on July 31, 1760 illustrates. There, the British army remained in the area for 
nearly three months, and it used anything and everything that could be burnt as 
fuel, including fruit-bearing trees, hedges, and even wooden statues of  saints.95 
In order to explore further the effects of  Early Modern armies on the natural 
environment in wartime, case studies for regions that frequently became the 
theatre of  war could prove exceptionally fruitful.
In the end, this poses the critical question of  the place of  military theory in 
relation to military practice and, on a larger scale, in relation to warfare and the 
environment as a whole. While military theory certainly provided a framework 
for discussion of  scorched earth tactics, an explicit reference to theoretical texts 
is hard to grasp in military practice itself: French officials did not quote de Rohan 
every time they ordered the destruction of  villages and forage. However, even 
if  works on military theory presented idealized versions of  how their authors 
thought war should be waged, they often included examples of  contemporary 
warfare. While military theory certainly does not reflect military practice itself, it 
forms a special discourse in which these practices are described and situated in an 
argumentative context. Thus, the treatises make it possible to analyze the special 
discourse on war and the systems and categories in which military knowledge 
was conceived and presented. As far as the relationship between warfare and 
the environment is concerned, this means that violence against the natural 
environment was a defining part of  Early Modern military knowledge, and even 
at the end of  the eighteenth century it had not vanished from the discussions. 
Rather, it remained embedded in contemporary conceptions of  “just” war and 
the “right” and “rational” conduct of  operations.
When Carl von Clausewitz, sometimes regarded as the “prophet“ of  
modern warfare, worked on his influential opus magnum “On War,” he drew 
on a vast body of  works by military theorists like Feuquières, authors whose 
writings were available to him in the Prussian royal library.96 It would certainly 
be an exaggeration to draw a clear line from Clausewitz to Agent Orange. But 
the Early Modern military theory on which Clausewitz at least partially relied 
reminds us just how deeply embedded environmental warfare was in military 
thought well before the of  armies of  the post-industrial age developed their now 
infamous capabilities of  mass destruction.
95  Petersen, “Feuer und Eis,” 72–74.
96  Heuser, Strategy before Clausewitz, 186–87.
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